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M

y research is centered on the arguments of Rene Descartes, a
17th Century philosopher, in his work The Meditations. The
Meditations is composed of six entries, which are six meditations,
written in form of narration. His narrative takes form in an
intricately composed piece of writing, a clever argument presented through a
precise and fascinating procedure. However, the artful fashion in which he conveys
his method is far from an immaculately composed calculation which Descartes
leads one to believe. In this paper I will present Descartes’ procedural destruction
and following reassembly of the external world and his proposed discovery of the
proper foundation of the sciences. I shall then discuss the unmistakable faults in
his argument, presenting counter-arguments posed by Descartes’ contemporaries
and further offering my own objections. I will conclude by presenting a theoretical
epistemology found beneath the surface of the glaring errors which Descartes
ostensibly failed to recognize.
I. Methodological Doubt
Descartes chooses to exercise some fantasy in his narrative, initially claiming
that nothing exists. Why is it that Descartes’ Meditations, composed of such
outlandish claims, remain a prominent piece of philosophical work? It is
the riddle, comprised of absurd notions and bearing esoteric consequences
which Descartes presents to begin his inquiries to understand how we know,
what we know. These notions impel Descartes’ complete upheaval of all
knowledge and any possibility of our having knowledge. He totally negates
all of existence, and does so with just three propositions: the refutation of the
senses, “the dream regress”, and the supposed existence of an “evil deceiver”.
Assuming total non-existence is hardly a conventional sentiment, and not
one which any person would readily embrace. However, he so guilefully
guides one through his thinking that it almost seems possible. Nonetheless,
the idea that nothing exists is absurd. Reason would indicate that it should be
a relatively simple task to dismiss the absurd; but this is not the case. The past
four hundred years of philosophy has failed to offer a solution, and thus it
has become a thorn in the side of philosophy to once and for all rid ourselves
of this conundrum. I will begin by elucidating the ways in which Descartes
brings all of existence into doubt.
Descartes’ radical external world skepticism is an essential element in his
work. With complete destruction of all knowledge and existence, he clears

BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

2010 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 35

the table to build his own epistemology. He reaches this radical
point of skepticism by employing three propositions of doubt
in his quest for a certain foundation of the sciences. He begins
by evaluating what he thinks he knows. He states he must reject
that which is even a potential item of doubt. Thus, to dismantle
his false beliefs, he must undercut the foundations which
support them. His ﬁrst move toward complete skepticism is a
stipulation which asserts that we must not trust that which has
deceived us even once. Therefore, he continues, since we have
been deceived by our senses we must not trust them. However,
this only applies in ambiguous circumstances, so he calls upon
an argument similar to one employed by the ancient skeptics,
the dream regress.
The ancient skeptics employed the argument of the dream
regress by asking how one knows that what one dreams is not
actual reality, and conversely; how it is that one knows what
we perceive as our waking hours not to be the ﬁctitious. The
ancient skeptics were not seeking to know anything, and in
fact, they believed nothing could be known; so they committed
themselves to a total suspension of judgment. This argument
was one of many they employed to reject claims of knowledge.
Descartes, on the other hand, places his own twist on the
ancient tactic and employs the argument to eventually gain
certainty. He asks if we may ever know we are not dreaming.
He argues that since everything we experience in reality may be
experienced identically in a dream, there is no way to discern
whether or not we are dreaming. However this still leaves
existence intact, because the elements of dreams resemble the
elements of the actual world.
To call reality into doubt, Descartes then supposes the existence
of an all powerful, evil deceiver, a supposition which he asserts
he cannot know to be false. Descartes supposes that this deceiver
has tricked him in every moment of what he perceived to be
life, such that, every feeling and every experience Descartes
ever had was merely a sequence synthesized by the deceiver.
Thus he renders himself unto a state of complete uncertainty
and denial of all known existence, since he cannot be certain
that this deceiver does not exist. Now let us consider Descartes’
recovery from this devastating state of non-existence.
II. Resurrecting Reality
Descartes reestablishes existence in a progression narrated
through The Meditations. He exits the void of non-existence as
he ﬁrst stipulates his own existence with the famous revelation of
“Cogito Ergo Sum” or; I think, therefore I am. This proposition
evades the doubt of the senses, the dream regress, and even
the evil deceiver. He must exist, for thought requires a thinker,
deception requires a deceived, and dreams, require a dreamer;
thus, he must exist as the necessary subject of these operations.
36 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 2010

Moreover, he exists as a thinking thing, since he discovers
thought to be his essence. He can conceptualize himself as
removed from a body, or any form of extended thing, but in
no way can he separate himself from his thought. Descartes
claims there is nothing he perceives with greater clarity than
his own thought, which he realizes through the light of nature,
an incorrigible faculty he comes to deem as clear and distinct
perception. He explains this revelation,
But do I not therefore also know what is required for
me to be certain of anything? Surely in this ﬁrst instance
of knowledge, there is nothing but a certain clear and
distinct perception of what I afﬁrm [....] I now seem
able to posit everything I clearly and distinctly perceive
to be true. (Descartes: p.72 Med III)
This light of nature, or clear and distinct perception, is
his second revelation of truth- that is, his mechanism for
recognizing truth.
Utilizing this certainty of his own existence, and this instrument
of recognizing truth, he moves to investigate what an idea is.
Since he is a thinking thing, he further wonders what the cause
of ideas is. To uncover this, he must ﬁrst understand causality.
He claims that, something may never arise from nothing; and
further, that whatever is in an effect, must be eminently present
in the cause. Therefore, something of greater perfection, cannot
be caused by something of less perfection; and thus likewise, an
idea may never come from nothing. Descartes then understands
that there must be an idea that is capable of producing all the
ideas he has, or may ever, have. This idea, in his calculation,
must be God, a being of supreme perfection. He derives this
conclusion from that fact that nothing present in him is able
to even resemble the perfection which inheres to idea of the
perfect being. He then concludes that this idea cannot originate
in himself, but further must emanate from something external;
that is, from the actual existence of the perfect being, God. Upon
this perfect and thus necessarily non-deceiving God, Descartes
then validates clear and distinct perception as an incorrigible
faculty. Still Descartes maintains, and rightly so, that the senses
must not be trusted at face value. That is, they are not guaranteed
to provide actual impressions of reality. Nevertheless, he also
retracts that they are to be completely rejected. He moves on to
insist that sensory input must be integrated through reason to
be validated and veriﬁed as certain. He illustrates this notions
in The Meditations with an example where he depicts seeing
people walking from afar, but all one can see is moving hats
and coats; however, we know through reason that these are
in fact people. Descartes thus posits that the senses do have
value in ascertaining truth insofar as they are employed in
corroboration with clear and distinct perception. Since God,
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

by Descartes’ deﬁnition, cannot be a deceiver, God would not
bestow upon him such deceptive resources. Now with the senses
corroborated by reason, and the veracity of which veriﬁed by
the integrity of God, Descartes validates the existence of the
external world, setting the proper foundation for the sciences.

I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids
reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure what we
clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God
exists. But we can be sure that God exists only because
we clearly and distinctly perceive this. (Arnauld: p.150)

he maneuvers his way through his conceptualization of ideas.
This inquiry leads him to question the modes of causality,
speciﬁcally the cause of ideas. The combination of these
examinations ﬁnally leads Descartes to a clear and distinct
understanding of the initial cause of all ideas, a cause which
necessarily exists, and that cause must be God. Yet despite
having previously applied this incorrigible faculty of clear and
distinct perception, Descartes proceeds to justify the veridical
nature of this faculty upon God in Meditation IV. So, he
uses this method to ﬁnd God, despite not having proven the
method to be valid. He offers no justiﬁcation because initially
he cannot. Instead, he asserts a rule stating that which is clearly
and distinctly perceived is always true. Thus, with unjustiﬁed
means, he arrives at the existence of God. Upon this conclusion
he then reverts back to show clear and distinct perception to
be valid based upon this new knowledge of a non-deceiving
God. Here we see an unwarranted premise which invalidly
proves a conclusion, followed by the unwarranted premise
being justiﬁed by the invalid conclusion; this is a text book
case of begging the question in circular argumentation. Hence,
his triumphs over the evil deceiver and escape from the dream
regress have miserably failed. He may know he exists, but
that is all--if he even knows so much.
Second, we should
consider a quite interesting problem offered from a position
of uncompromising logic. This point of view was offered by
another individual who received an advance copy of the text, a
Jesuit, Pierre Bourdin. Bourdin wrote to Friar Marin Mersenne,
a friend of Descartes (and the man responsible for issuing these
early copies of The Meditations), and said; “I have tried to treat
him as courteously as possible but I have never seen a paper
so full of faults” (Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch: 64). He
provides a few interesting points in response to Descartes’
escape from the skeptical abyss through the establishment of his
own existence. He argues against Descartes’ claim that despite
an inability to differentiate between reality and dreaming,
Descartes is nonetheless clearly and distinctly aware that he is
thinking in any dream; and therefore, must exist as the subject
of this thought. Bourdin rejects that Descartes may have any
clear and distinct perception of anything if he is dreaming.
Since the act of thought which Descartes supposes, may be
occurring in a dream, it is then also only a dream that this act
of thought is so clearly evident. Thus, no matter how Descartes
attempts to pose his clear and distinct thought in regard to the
dream regress, his supposed awareness is nothing but a dream,
and hence containing no reality, offering no way out of the
skeptical labyrinth.

Descartes’ ﬁrst step of committing this crime of argumentation
occurs through instituting the proposition of clear and distinct
perception, which he asserted as an incorrigible faculty in
the beginning of Meditation III. He exercises this faculty as

Bourdin’s next point centers on Descartes’ stipulation of
complete skepticism, denying all existence. Since Descartes has
established that nothing exists and has embraced this position,
for Bourdin, that is the end of Descartes’ road. He claims that

III. Critical Response from Descartes’ Contemporaries
Descartes solves his riddle with the necessary existence of a
benevolent God. This God, he claims, is the foundation for
all knowledge. However, assertions made throughout The
Meditations in establishing God’s existence are dubiously
conspicuous. If it is the case that the argument as whole can be
dissected and shown to be erroneous, or at least miscalculated,
then it would seem it should be more than possible to dissolve
the initial doubts which provoke these claims. However, such
a task is anything but simple. Unfortunately the refutation
of Descartes’ reassembly of the world, in the end, leaves his
three propositions of doubt (his riddle of complete external
world skepticism), intact. The magnitude which these three
doubts span is so immense that ﬁnding a crawl space to evade
deception may take more than a life time. So it will not be the
dissolution of the doubts we will consider, but the dissolution
of the argument presented to solve the proposed nulliﬁcation
of existence.
Descartes’ argument, from the cogito to the vindication of
the senses is muddled with ﬂaws. I would like to discuss a
few of these elements. The ﬁrst to be considered is called The
Cartesian Circle. As the name implies, it is a charge against
Descartes for arguing in a circle. This is a fallacious form of
argument in which one employs the premise, or premises, to
prove a conclusion, but then uses the conclusion to obversely
justify the premise, or premises.
This fallacy couched in Descartes’ prolix was exposed by
Descartes’ contemporaries, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre
Gassendi. They were given copies of The Meditations before it
was publicly circulated to respond and object--and object they
did. They each presented this very issue in their Objections to
The Meditations. Arnauld wrote,
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this position is intrinsically an eternal catacomb. If in the ﬁrst
premise nothing exists, it cannot be that anything may follow
to be established as existing. Bourdin says,
Nothing exists, you do not exist; you are not thinking;
you are not conscious[....]If the proposition ‘Nothing
exists’ is true, then the proposition ‘You do not exist
and you are not thinking’ is necessarily also true[...]you
insist that the proposition ‘Nothing exists’ is true.
Therefore the proposition ‘You do not exist and you
are not thinking’ is also true. (Bourdin: 342)
Simply, if nothing exists, even oneself, consequently, by
embracing this claim Descartes subjects himself to an
inescapable nothingness. Bourdin recommends that Descartes
adjust his premise to allow himself a possibility of establishing
certainty of any knowledge.
Further, another critical issue may be raised in relation to
Bourdin’s perspective. According to Descartes’ theory of
causation, something cannot come from nothing. If he believes
this to be true, and if in fact he establishes this state of endless
emptiness, he cannot, according to his own theory of causality,
escape this nothingness. Thus, when he does assert that he exists
as a thinking thing, after the fact of his skeptical annihilation
of existence, he contradicts his own metaphysics. As he would
then come from nothing, which Descartes says cannot be.
Therefore, he cannot be, and the cogito is lost.
IV. Proving God and a Rising Suspicion
Despite the calm elegance and natural comfort offered to
the reader through the narrative, the argument formulated
by Descartes is far from pristine. The ﬂaws seem so glaring
and blatant, that it leaves one with a peculiar wonder of how
Descartes missed these errors. The fallacy of begging the question
by circular reasoning is not any secret. It is an elementary form
of fallacious argumentation and is no minor oversight. In fact,
it singlehandedly undermines his entire argument. Since God
is the basis for Descartes’ entire epistemology and this fallacy
negates the establishment of God, this fallacy negates his entire
epistemology. These errors are so grave and so evident it gives
rise to suspicion; could it be that he was not sincere? Even if,
somehow, Descartes did in fact overlook these factors, what
may be said about his proof of God’s existence? Aside from the
exhaustive lengths taken in its prose, it is shocking how feeble
this proof turns out to be.
In attempting to prove God’s existence, Descartes utterly
failed. I see no substantial difference between his assessment
of the cause of ideas parlayed into a proof of God’s existence
and that of Saint Anselm’s ontological argument as proof of
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God’s existence. Anselm’s argument, of the 11th century, goes
(condensed) as follows:
1: God is something than which nothing grater can
be thought.
2: Even a fool must admit that something than which
nothing greater can be thought necessarily exists
in the understanding, as this is understood upon
hearing and what is understood must exist in the
understanding.
3: Something that than which nothing greater can be
thought cannot exist solely in the understanding.
4: Since that which exists in reality is greater than
that which exists solely in the understanding.
5: But if that than which nothing greater can be
thought only existed in the understanding, then
something greater could be thought than that than
which nothing greater can be thought.
6: But this is not possible, so that than which nothing
greater can be thought must exist in reality.
Therefore: God exists. (Anselm: 415)
However, this proves nothing; there is no actual necessity. He
simply posits ideas and in an entanglement of concepts and
prolix, he concludes God’s existence. But all he may really say
is, if God were to exist, nothing greater could be conceived.
Much is the same for Descartes; if it were the case that our
ideas indeed needed a corresponding actuality from which their
objective reality (our mental image or concept) emanates, then
God would exist. Further, and related in an even closer manner
to Anselm’s argument, are the implications drawn by Descartes
through stipulating the perfection of God. He claims that since
God is most perfect, and that which exists has more perfection
than that which is merely conceived, God therefore necessarily
exists. If it were the case that Anselm’s argument had weathered
the testaments of time and had truly proven the existence of
God, Descartes would not have needed to prove God existed.
However, since Anselm’s argument proved nothing, why did
Descartes adopt such a similar line of reasoning for his own
proof?
Descartes writes with such an air of conﬁdence that deigns to
identify the one true method of attaining truth and grounding
knowledge. I appreciate this writing insofar as it displays a
clever craft of a theoretical epistemology, but in no way can I
subscribe to the actual content of his fantasy. It is undeniable
that Descartes was a man of remarkable intellect, so it does not
seem possible that he was unaware of these defects. However,
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

I do understand the mere occurrence of these mistakes does
not prove anything. Nevertheless, the barefaced manner in
which they appear is certainly dubious; and I ﬁnd it outright
suspicious. The remainder of this paper will explore ideas
regarding a potential hidden agenda behind The Mediations.
V. Dissimulation Theory
The idea that Descartes had a hidden agenda in his work may be
formally addressed as dissimulation theory. Louis Loeb explains,
“According to dissimulation hypotheses, Descartes, in The
Meditations, intentionally misrepresented important aspects
of his philosophy” (Loeb: 243). Given the highly speculative
nature of such hypotheses, there are many different views, or
approaches, one might take here. I will focus on Descartes’
appeal to divine veracity as grounds for the function of clear
and distinct perception (upon which Descartes would prove
the existence of the external world,) as an insincere notion.
To begin, we must understand a tactical inconsistency regarding
the function of the evil deceiver in Meditation I, contrasted
with its application in Meditation III. In Meditation I, the
deceiver is an instrument to raise complete doubt regarding
sensory experience, and simulates the external world to seem to
exist when in reality it does not. As Descartes explains,
I will suppose [...] an evil genius, supremely powerful
and clever, who has directed his entire effort at
deceiving me. I will regard the heavens, the air, the
earth, the colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things
as nothing but the bedeviling hoaxes. (Descartes: 62)
This is a quite severe assertion pertaining to a vast range of
doubt. In Meditation III, the deceiver, who remains intact,
assumes a different application than we see in the Meditation I.
In Meditation III it is not the material world in question, rather
it is the deceiver’s potential ability to compromise clear and
distinct perception: Descartes asserts,
Because it occurred to me that some God could
perhaps have given me a nature such that I might be
deceived even about matters that seemed most evident
[or clear and
distinct....] On the other hand,
whenever I turn my attention to those very things
that I think I perceive with such great clarity, I am so
completely persuaded by them[...]so long as I think I
am something, he will never bring it about that I am
nothing[....] For it is true that I do exist. Nor will he even
bring it about that perhaps two plus three might equal
more or less than ﬁve[....]Because I have no reason for
thinking that there is a God who is a deceiver, the basis
for doubting[...]is very tenuous and[...]metaphysical.
(Descartes: 70-71)
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How is it that at this point in Meditation III, only with the
knowledge that he exists as a thinking thing, is Descartes able to
so drastically undermine the previously attributed ubiquitous
force of negating existence from the evil deceiver? It seems that
there is no justiﬁable way. Further illustrating the inconsistency
of the deceiver’s application is the severity applied to the doubts
in Meditation I which encompass even arithmetic, as Descartes
says, “others sometimes make mistakes in matters that they
believe they know most perfectly, may I not, in like fashion, be
deceived every time I add two and three or count the sides of a
square” (Descartes: 61)? Whereas in Meditation III (as we saw
in the former quote, 70-71), this doubt is rendered “tenuous”.
One thing remains quite clear at this point; Descartes did not
treat the doubts raised in Meditation III as seriously as he did
when he initially called them into the picture in Meditation
I. As Loeb writes, “Descartes constructs the hypothesis of
Meditation III in a way that enables him to minimize the doubt
it generates, that is, to treat the doubt as slight in contrast to
the doubt of Meditation I” (Loeb: 253). This indicates that if
Descartes was insincere regarding the doubts of Meditation
III, what must follow is an inspection regarding whether or
not Descartes was sincere regarding these doubts in the ﬁrst
instance. However, regardless of his sincerity in Meditation
I, due to the inconsistent application of these doubts, he
therefore undermines his solutions to these problems; which
are his proof of the existence of God, his appeal divine veracity-but moreover, the epistemological position placed upon God.
For if the doubt he is answering is not taken seriously, then
neither should its solution; or, if the doubt is serious, but
must be minimized so to be toppled, the solution is rendered
worthless. Conclusively, if the argument is inconsistent, it is
invalid and we must not accept Descartes’ proof of God or
anything which he asserts as contingent upon it. With these
elements withdrawn, is there an epistemological position we
may extract from Descartes’ work?
Henceforth we shall regard God as a dispensable element of
Descartes’ epistemology presented in The Meditations. Now we
must consider the role of Meditation I, presenting complete
external world skepticism. The onset of these doubts are set
forth most sincerely by Descartes; or if not, to at least be
taken seriously. They ring the bells of the ancient skeptics,
preaching “ephoche”, employing a transposed “isothenia”
which shall plague any form of Philosophy; including the
Aristotelian. However Descartes is in no way a classic skeptic,
he has birthed a new, modern form of skepticism. Descartes’
skepticism reveals his hidden agenda, so whether or not he was
fully sincere in entertaining the idea of the evil deceiver; he
fully intended that we should. For his reduction of knowledge
in itself is a cunning act, as it is assembled to reﬂect, or “to
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set the stage”, for the introduction of his metaphysics; that is,
without warrant Descartes induces an epistemological crisis in
speciﬁc relation to his theory. As Michael Williams claims, “But
Descartes does not acknowledge the theoretical considerations
that mandate this reduction of skepticism to a theoretical
problem in epistemology. Rather, he represents the reduction
as a condition of making his project practicable” (Williams:
124). This subvert introduction is seen progressively through
the presentation of doubts in Meditation I, as he immediately
attacks the senses, though they are not fully dispelled since
the concessions made against them only apply to ambiguous
instances. To completely nullify the senses, and further, our
ability to differentiate reality from what is ﬁction, he summons
the dream regress. Finally, he nulliﬁes reality itself with the evil
deceiver. However that, which remains, even with no sense
of reality, is the mind. This is the real revelation procured
through this procedure, and the arrival at this condition was
not an innocent conclusion which Descartes realized through
pure introspection. Williams explains, “We see, then, that
the progressive doubt of the Meditations is informed throu
ghout[....]Descartes’ distinctive skeptical problems, and the
metaphysical framework that makes it possible to raise them
are introduced together” (Williams:129).
It is most evident that Descartes insists the senses take a
back seat to the intellect. The intellect, for Descartes, is the
foundation of knowledge. He poses what he believes to be an
indelible presentation that the intellect, or faculties of reason, is
epistemologically prior to the senses. That is, as Loeb suggests,
from The Meditations one might extract, “the conception of
a hierarchy of cognitive faculties” (Loeb: 254). This is to say,
there is a foundationalist approach employed by Descartes in
The Meditations that is not built upon God. The Meditations
established all truth upon the perfection of God, deeming God
as most basic. However, as we observe through the method of
doubt, God itself is lost as nothing exists. Critically, and of
utmost importance, what is known before God as Descartes
was confronted with the supposition of an evil deceiver, is the
fact that Descartes himself exists; that is, the cogito. This is the
crucial point of divergence from what Descartes presents at face
value, and what is hypothesized in this theory of dissimulation.
The most fundamental element to his position is the assertion;
I think, therefore I am; this piece of knowledge is the most
epistemologically basic, not God. Therefore, it is the mind that
grounds the “pyramid” of knowledge without the validation of
God. Descartes questions in the beginning of Meditation III,
But do I not therefore also know what is required
for me to be certain of anything? Surely in this ﬁrst
instance of knowledge, there is nothing but a certain
clear and distinct perception of what I afﬁrm [....]
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I now seem able to posit everything I clearly and
distinctly perceive to be true. (Descartes: 70)
Again, we are introduced to the essential mechanism of
ascertaining truth, prior to God. This was, however, invalid in
the literal context of The Meditations, but as we’ve dismissed
the role of the supreme being, clear and distinct perception
ﬁts comfortably as the intellectual foundation which prescribes
our afﬁrmation of beliefs. Descartes expounds on this notion
when he speaks about “the light of nature,” a notion I take this
to be synonymous with clear and distinct perception (in a quite
poetic way), describing the function of our mind in its purest
form. As Descartes characterizes, “There is [...] no other faculty
that I can trust as much as this light and which could teach that
these things are not true” (Descartes: 72). Here we have a notion
of an incorrigible substratum upon which we may employ the
formulation of belief. As Loeb writes, “The claim that reason
is epistemologically basic, and hence epistemologically prior
to sense-perception in particular, is not itself deduced as a
consequence of Divine veracity” (Loeb: 257). Hence our ability
to reason is the mode of which all these faculties and sensations
will be ﬁltered unto the light of nature.
It is important to consider the process of understanding
Descartes imposes upon not only as to further illuminate the
structure of our gaining knowledge but to further disavow the
Academics. Descartes claims that our errors are “a privation or
a lack of some knowledge that somehow ought to be in me”
(Descartes: 82). He further asserts that errors occur as a result of
our ability to freely choose in action or belief. That is, our free
choice runs awry as we apply fallible resources of knowledge
in adjudicating potential choices. This is a misguided and
perﬁdious procedure which leads one to misjudge, and elect
false beliefs. This process of vindicating a given proposition,
or choice, is judgment. Our judgments are the process toward
of understanding. Our understanding is the process of our
knowledge. Therefore, it would follow from this line of thought
why Descartes made such a grandiose stipulation which
guaranteed veridical inveteracy; “for as often as I restrain my
will when I make judgments, so that it extends only to those
matters that the intellect clearly and distinctly discloses to it, it
plainly cannot happen that I err”(Descartes: 87). Therefore clear
and distinct perception, the pure function of mind (the light of
nature), is the key to knowledge. These intellectual epiphanies
occur as a result of the properly functioning, interacting, and
ordered set of cognitive faculties. That is, the application of
proper reasoning in regard to matters of judgment. It is the
role of reason to adjudicate that which is understood and that
which is confused. For reason can discriminate, or correct,
any entity with which it is presented. Therefore, and most
importantly, reason can defy and correct that which is known
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

by the senses, thus, conclusively showing that the senses are not
epistemologically prior to the mind.
V. Conclusion
Thus, Descartes does not wish to establish external world
skepticism. Rather, he wishes to ground the senses and
knowledge of external existence upon the function of the
epistemologically prior faculties of the intellect. He buttresses
this intention upon the stipulation that reason cogitates all
the sensory input we receive. However, and undeniably so,
an immense amount of what we know, and who we are, and
become, is predicated by everything we externally experience.
For Descartes, this is good and well. Nonetheless, the basis
of judging and understanding our experiences is not focally
through the senses--but through the mind. Conclusively, The
Meditations suggest that knowledge ferments through the
intellect, whether or not God exists.
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